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Introduction
After about forty years of development of data privacy
law in the world, at last Africa has slowly started to be
involved in the discourse. In the last decade Africa wit-
nessed the development of nine enactments on data
privacy in Cape Verde (22 January 2001), Seychelles
(24 December 2003), Burkina Faso (20 April 2004),
Mauritius (17 June 2004), Tunisia (27 July 2004),
Senegal (15 January 2008), Morocco (18 February
2009), Benin (22 May 2009), and Angola (17 June
2011). Other countries have Bills on similar law
pending before their legislative bodies (Ghana, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and South
Africa) or are still discussing drafts of such laws in
various fora according to the legislative traditions of re-
spective countries. It is imperative to mention that this
development is largely due to the inertia of the Euro-
pean Directive 95/46/EC. The latter requires that any
transfer of personal data to third countries (ie non-
European Union/EEA member states) must provide an
adequate level of data protection. Since African coun-
tries are third countries to Directive 95/46/EC they are
subject to this clause. The other reason that has pro-
vided an environment for the development of data
privacy law in Africa is the rapid development of infor-
mation and communications technologies in the con-
tinent. Yet, despite this legislative development,
literature on data privacy in Africa has remained scant,
fragmented, and has continued to grow at a snail’s
pace. This article intends to situate the contours of this
literature to uncover its nature, quality, the scope of
issues addressed, and existing impediments inhibiting
its growth. It also aims to recommend strategies to
improve the situation of this scholarship.
The contribution of this article is particularly im-
portant in four main ways. By consolidating a fairly
comprehensive listing of the major literature, the article
provides researchers with easily accessible information
on the privacy and data protection literature in Africa.
While this information is likely to be more beneficial
to comparative researches or studies, at the same time
it offers a useful starting point for a background review
for non-comparative research or studies. Also import-
ant, this article provides, though more generally, an
overview of the current state of systems of privacy and
data protection policies and regulations across Africa.
In addition, it identifies the specific issues which have
so far been addressed by this literature and in so doing,
it hints at which issues are currently under-researched
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Abstract
† A literature review is pivotal to any scientific re-
search or writing. Quite often a prudent research-
er may not embark on research or writing a
scientific piece of work without first reviewing
the literature. Yet this literature may sometimes
not be readily available, especially in a relatively
new area of scholarship, or its availability may be
challenging.
† In this article I survey the major literature on
privacy and data protection in Africa as an emer-
ging field of law.
† I argue that currently this literature is under-
developed.
† I offer a modest proposal that efforts have to be
directed towards training, researches, networking,
the creation of modern libraries, inter-country/
sub- or regional discussions and establishing
journals specifically dedicated to privacy and data
protection law issues.
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or not researched at all. Accordingly, researchers may
wish to focus on such issues for their future research
agendas. Finally, this article may serve as the catalyst
for the networking of experts by identifying who has
researched what, where, when, and why.
Conceptual framework
Privacy and data protection are two contentious con-
cepts in the discourse of privacy. It is loosely assumed
that the two concepts belong to the two sides of the At-
lantic. While the term privacy is widely used in the USA
the term data protection is commonly used in European
jurisdictions instead.1 Yet this territorial use of the two
terms is problematic for two reasons. First, it fails to
distinguish the inherent similarities and differences
between these concepts. Second, at some point both-
terms find their way to the opposite side of the Atlantic,
and henceforth exist simultaneously side-by-side.
Some commentators tend to view privacy and data
protection as synonymous and the terms interchange-
able. Yet others have maintained the opposite view.
Cuijpers raises a question, ‘is the right to data protec-
tion the same as the right to privacy?’2 In response he
concurs with Peter Block that data protection and
privacy are not the same. Cuijpers argues that, since an
individual right to privacy safeguards an undisturbed
private life and offers the individual control over intru-
sion into the private sphere, it is different from protec-
tion of the individual with regard to the processing of
personal data which is not restricted to the private
sphere of the individual.3 In the same vein De Hert
and Gutwirth argue that ‘data protection’s real object-
ive is to protect individual citizens against the unjusti-
fied collection, storage, use, and dissemination of their
personal details. This objective seems to be indebted to
the central objective of the right to privacy, to protect
against unjustified interference in personal life. Many
scholars therefore hold data protection and privacy to
be interchangeable.’4 Yet in refuting the above view,
they argue that equating privacy and data protection on
the basis of the objectives each wants to achieve is a
narrow view. To the contrary, De Hert and Gutwirth
hold that there are important differences between the
two in terms of scope, goals, and content.5 By subscrib-
ing to Bygrave’s views extracted from his article, The
Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law,6 De Hert and
Gutwirth continue to argue that while privacy obvious-
ly occupies a central place in data protection law, their
characterization of data protection law as solely or even
essentially concerned with safeguarding privacy is mis-
leading.7 Data protection laws serve a multiplicity of
interests, which in some cases extend well beyond trad-
itional conceptualizations of privacy.8
The difficulty of defining privacy and data protec-
tion has at times led to frustrated commentators failing
to clearly point out the differences between the two
concepts. For example, Kuner argues that privacy can
be seen as a concept which is both broader than and
independent of data protection, although there can be a
significant overlap between the two.9
Somewhat confusingly, De Hert and Schreuders
argue that although the terms data protection and
privacy share certain features and goals, and are fre-
quently used as synonyms, they are not identical.10
They are therefore described as being ‘twins, but not
identical’.11 These scholars argue that, although
clearly ingrained in privacy protection, data protection
does not necessarily raise privacy issues.12 Contrary
to privacy rules, data protection rules are not pro-
hibitive.13 Instead they organize and control the way
personal data can only be legitimately processed if
some conditions pertaining to the transparency of the
processing, the participation of the data subject, and
the accountability of the data controller are met.14
Yet, between the two ends of the spectrum, there are
commentators who, in an attempt to reconcile the op-
posing views, have invented the new concept data
1 LA Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and
Limits (Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York 2002)
1.
2 C Cuijpers, ‘A Private Law Approach to Privacy: Mandatory Law
Obliged?’ (2007) 4/4 SCRIPTed 304–18, at 312.
3 Ibid.
4 P De Hert and S Gutwirth, ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of
Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalism in Action’, in S Gutwirth,
et al. (eds), Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer, New York 2009) 3–
44, at 3.
5 Ibid, at 9.
6 LA Bygrave, ‘The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law’ (2001) 24/1
University of New South Wales Law Journal 277–283, at 282; available
at ,http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/6.html.
accessed 26 February 2012.
7 De Hert and Gutwirth (n 4), at 10.
8 Ibid.
9 C Kuner, ‘An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues
and Prospects’ (2009) 25 Computer Law & Security Review 307–317, at
308.
10 P De Hert and E Schreuders, ‘The Relevance of Convention 108’, 33, 42,
Proceedings of the Council of Europe Conference on Data Protection,
Warsaw, 19–20 November 2001 cited in EU Study on the Legal Analysis of
a Single Market for the Information Society, DLA PIPER, UK, November
2009, ch. 4, at 4.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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privacy.15 Bygrave argues that in contrast to the
concept of data protection which fails to indicate the
central interests served by the norms to which it is
meant to apply, data privacy is more appropriate as it
better communicates the central interest(s) at stake and
provides a bridge for synthesizing North America and
European policy discussion.16 Closely similar to
Bygrave other commentators tend to use the concept
information privacy instead for the above discussed
sense. Karanja, for example, argues that
the concept ‘information privacy’ is concerned with the
protection of personal data. In Europe, the term “data pro-
tection” is used to refer to ‘information privacy’. Although
the two concepts, information privacy and data protection,
may differ somewhat in meaning and the scope of the
former being wider than the latter (sic). Both expressions
are used interchangeably to refer to the same thing—
protection of personal data.’17
Attempts to demarcate the realm of privacy from that
of data protection have also been made using the case
law of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) interpreting the right to privacy
enshrined in Human Rights Treaties. The latter include
Articles 17 and 8 of the International Covenants on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 and the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms(ECHR) 1950 respectively.
Although there seems to be consensus among commen-
tators on the limitations of the Strasburg privacy case
law in spelling out data protection principles, the rea-
soning has varied significantly. For example, in
summing the limited scope of the Strasburg case law in
relation to data protection, Bygrave argues:
at present, the case law developed around the right to
privacy in Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 8 of the
ECHR falls short of explicitly stipulating data protection
guarantees as comprehensive as those found in instruments
concerned specifically with data protection. Moreover, the
case law is somewhat confusing: the principles for process-
ing personal data which emerge from it are often sketchy
and of little prescriptory value. This is so even with the
relatively extensive body of case law developed around
Article 8 of the ECHR. Too often there has been failure by
the Commission and/or Court to make clear exactly which
elements of the contested data processing practice has
interfered with the right under Article 8(1); too often has
there been a concomitant failure to describe the threatened
interest.18
However, Bygrave notes that the omitted prescriptory
value of Article 8 case law in the field of data protec-
tion is not simply due to the Commission and Court.19
It is also due to the fact that a large proportion of the
case law concerns data processing in a rather special
context (ie, secret surveillance activities by police or in-
telligence agencies), while almost none of it deals with
private entities’ data processing practices.20 Notwith-
standing all these limitations, Bygrave was optimistic
about the willingness of the Strasbourg organs to adopt
data protection provisions which grow nationally and
internationally, and that these organs will increasingly
expand the right to privacy in the light of these laws.21
Bygrave’s optimism was borne out seven years later by
Karanja in his analyses of the case law of the ECtHR.
Summarizing the value of this case law in relation to
data processing practices Karanja argues:
Going by the recent case decisions of the ECtHR, it is no
longer doubtful that data protection is a human right al-
though the Convention does not state this. As indicated
above, the Court has boldly manifested data protection
principles in its decisions by adopting the language of data
protection law. But what still lacks in the Council of
Europe human rights framework is a positive statement in
the general human rights legislation that human rights
protects personal data. Such statement would give data
protection the universal status enjoyed by human rights
principles. The EU has cured the anomaly by enacting a
data protection provision in its Charter of fundamental
rights and the EU Constitution.’22
It is noteworthy that the above view by Karanja are in
sharp contrast to the observation of the European
Court of First Instance in Bavarian Lager Co. Ltd v
Commission.23 In this case, the Court observed, ‘it
should also be emphasized that the fact that the
concept of “private life” is a broad one, in accordance
15 PM Schwartz and JR Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law: A Study of United
States Data Protection (Michie Law Publishers, Charlottesville 1996) 5.
16 LA Bygrave, ‘Privacy Protection in a Global Context—A Comparative
Overview’ (2004) 47 Scandinavian Studies in Law 319–48, at 321–2.
17 SK Karanja, ‘Schengen Information System and Border Control Co-
Operation: A Transparency and Proportionality Evaluation’, PhD Thesis,
Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, (2006) 86.
18 LA Bygrave, ‘Data Protection Pursuant to the Right in Human Rights
Treaties’ (1998) 6/3 International Journal of Law and Information
Technology 247–84, at 283–4; see also, L Ulyashyna, ‘Does case law
developed by the European Court of Human Rights pursuant to ECHR
Article 8 add anything substantial to the rules and principles found in
ordinary data protection principle?’, A Tutorial Paper presented at the
Norwegian Centre for Computers and Law(NRCCL) (Spring 2006).
19 Bygrave (n 18).
20 Ibid, at 284.
21 Ibid.
22 Karanja (n 17), at 123.
23 Case T-194/04 at ,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:62004A0194:EN:HTML. accessed 26 February 2012.
Judgment was delivered at Luxembourg on 8 November 2007.
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with the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights, and that the right to the protection of personal
data may constitute one of the aspects of the right to
respect of private life . . . does not mean that all per-
sonal data necessarily fall within the concept of
“private life”.’24 Moreover, De Hert and Gutwirth have
more recently critically evaluated the case law of Stras-
bourg and find that it not only fails but also lacks any
potential to embrace data protection principles. These
scholars have advanced three reasons to support their
claims. First, there are comparatively few Strasbourg
judgments that offer criteria for excessive, unnecessary,
and/or unjustified collection of personal data.25
According to them, this is due to the fact that the
Court has overemphasized the legality requirement.26
Second, based on these scholars’ experience of this case
law, they believe that many Court judgments allow pro-
cessing authorities too much leeway.27 Only flagrant
abuse or risky use of data which is easily used in a dis-
criminatory way is very closely scrutinized, whereas
other kinds of processing of data are left untouched ‘as
long that there is no blood’.28 Third, the very basis of
data protection recognition in Strasbourg is not as
solid as it looks.29 For example, the ECtHR has on one
occasion stipulated that Article 8 of ECHR does not
give a general right to access personal data contrary to
the data protection instruments.30 Also, the Court has
made a distinction between personal data that fall
within the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR and personal
data that do not.31 De Hert and Gutwirth thus observe
that in the eyes of the Court there is processing of per-
sonal data that affects the private life and processing of
personal data that does not affect the private life of
individuals contrary to the general protection of all
personal data offered by data protection regulations.32
An overview of the above understandings attempting
to distinguish privacy from data protection reveals three
important conclusions. First, in a strict sense privacy
and data protection are two distinct and separate con-
cepts although they have overlapping objectives. The
differences between the two concepts reside in their
scope, goals, and content. However, it is important at
this juncture to argue that those attempts which differ-
entiate privacy from data protection—pointing out that
the former is prohibitive while the latter is not—are il-
lusive. For example, one of the mandatory legal pre-
conditions for processing personal data in the Directive
95/46/EC is consent.33 The notion of consent is trad-
itionally linked to the idea that the data subject should
be in control of the use that is being made of his
data.34 In turn the notion of control is linked to the
fact that the data subject should be able to withdraw
his consent consequently preventing any further pro-
cessing of the individual’s personal data by the data
controller.35 Also, consent is related to the concept of
informational self-determination, making the auton-
omy of the data subject both a pre-condition and a
consequence of consent.36 In essence, consent gives the
data subject influence over the processing of data.37
However, although consent is one of the legal precondi-
tions for processing personal data, it is not absolute.
Sometimes the data subject’s consent is difficult to
obtain in real life38 or it is subject to exemptions for
the purposes of public interest such as defence and na-
tional security. Notwithstanding, it is arguable that
consent is prohibitive to data processing activities,
equating data protection to privacy to that extent. A
similar view is maintained by De Hert and Gutwirth,
although they generally view privacy as prohibitive as
opposed to data protection. These scholars argue that
data protection also prohibits certain forms of process-
ing of personal data, for instance ‘sensitive data’.39 The
second conclusion drawn from the attempts to differ-
entiate privacy from data protection is that the two con-
cepts are increasingly becoming synonymous and hence
interchangeable in their daily uses. As rightly observed
by Kuner:
Calls for an international framework have tended to mix the
terms ‘data protection’ and ‘privacy’. For example, the reso-
lution approved at the 30th International Conference in
24 Ibid, para. 118 of the Judgment.
25 De Hert and Gutwirth (n 4), at 23.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, at 24.
30 Ibid; see also Gaskin v United Kingdom, ECtHR, Strasburg, Application
No. 10454/83 (1989), para. 37 of the judgment.
31 Ibid, at 24–5.
32 Ibid; see also Pierre Herbecq and the Association Ligue des droits de
l’homme v Belgium. Cf. ECommHR, Pierre Herbecq and the Association
Ligue des droits de l’homme v Belgium, Decision of 14 January 1998 on
the applicability of Applications Nos 32200/96 and 32201/96 (joined)
(1999) DRparas 92–98.
33 See, e.g., Art 7(a) and 8(2), (a) of the Directive 95/46/EC.
34 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the
Definition of Consent’, 01197/11/EN, WP187, p.8, (adopted 13 July
2011).
35 Ibid, at 9.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 See, e.g., S. Elahi, ‘Privacy and Consent in the Digital Era’ (2009) 14/3
Information Security Technical Report 113–18, at 115; see also, EA
Whitley, ‘Informational Privacy, Consent and the “Control” of Personal
Data’ (2009) 14/3 Information Security Technical Report 154–9, at
155–6.
39 De Hert and Gutwirth (n 4), at 4.
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Strasburg quoted above [,http://privacyconference2008.
org/index.php?page_id14197.] refers to ‘the rights to data
protection and privacy’, while the principles adopted by the
‘Global Network Initiative’, a group formed by a number of
companies, non-governmental organizations, and academics,
deal with ‘the internationally recognized human rights of
freedom of expression and privacy’, thus focusing more on
privacy than on data protection. The ‘Global Privacy Stand-
ard’, published in November 2006 by a working group led
by Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner, refers
many times to ‘privacy’, but the principles themselves deal
with topics such as consent, purpose limitation, and access
rights, that have traditionally been thought to be key con-
cepts of data protection law.40
The third conclusion is that when the context in which
the concepts of privacy and data protection are used is
not provided, one has to carefully scrutinize the princi-
ples covered, their scope and application. This is im-
portant because sometimes the true context in which
these concepts are used needs to be identified in order
to ascertain consequential implications from their
application.
In this article both concepts: privacy and data protec-
tion are used interchangeably unless the specific context
excludes the use of the other and any collective refer-
ence to privacy and data protection connotes either the
former or latter term.
Methodology
The collection of literature reviewed in this article was
gradual and has taken a long time. It actually started
way back in 2005 when I was still a student of law at
the University of Oslo, Norway, and continued until
the time of writing the manuscript for this article. I
used four main approaches to obtain such literature.
The first method was through library membership: at
the Norwegian Research Centre for Computers and
Law (NRCCL), University of Oslo, Norway (2005–
2006); Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Belgium (2009–date)
where I am a freelance researcher with the Law Science
Technology & Society (LSTS); Staats- und Universita¨t-
bibliothek Bremen, University of Bremen, Germany
(2011–date); and University of South Africa (UNISA)
(28 June 2011–29 June 2011). The second approach
was through subscription to or purchase of relevant lit-
erature. Subscription to databases or the purchase of
specific articles or issues containing such articles was
mainly through the Internet. In some cases I purchased
literature directly from bookstores. The third method I
used is open source resources, for example, the Social
Science Research Network (SSRN); African Journals
Online (AJOL); Scandinavian Studies in Law Databases
(Sc.St.L). It is worth mentioning that some of these
resources are partly limited; I relied on permitted
access. The fourth and final method involved making
requests to authors of relevant literature to supply their
works that I needed. Apart from that, this method
served another important role. It facilitated my contact
with data privacy experts across Africa, Australia,
Europe, and America.
Literature review
The literature reviewed in this article consists mainly of
published and unpublished works. In the former case,
the survey is limited to books and published journal
articles while the latter ranges from dissertations, con-
ference and workshop paper presentations, commentar-
ies, reports, and working papers. This literature extends
from before 2005 to February 2012. Another factor lim-
iting the scope of this review is language. Only litera-
ture published in English is reviewed. This is due to
the linguistic limitation I had in accessing literature in
other languages. Yet, it serves to communicate the
issues I intend, as in most cases speakers of French or
other languages possess some minimum understanding
of English but the opposite is often not the case. More-
over, in order to facilitate and ease understanding of
this literature, I have classified it by means of two cri-
teria. The first is the geographical scope covered regard-
less of the originality of the author. Under this
classification there is literature addressing issues cover-
ing Africa generally; West Africa; North Africa; Eastern
Africa; Horn of Africa; and Southern Africa. Specific
countries within particular regions may be indicated in
the course of the review. This classification serves a
number of purposes. It can roughly indicate which
region and country has what level of literature. This in
turn may explain the factors for the varying develop-
ment of the literature on privacy and data protection
in Africa. The second criterion for the classification of
the literature in this article is based on specific themes
addressed by a class of literature. This is important as
it helps to avoid unnecessary repetition of common
issues and themes addressed in the literature. Also sig-
nificant, the classification offers a comparison of
similar issues in different regions. Combining the two
criteria, the present review will appear under sub-
themes and corresponding geographical region. I have
40 Kuner (n 9).
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to mention one caveat. Sometimes one item of the
literature may address issues transcending more than
one region or theme. Yet no confusion is likely to arise
as each piece will be treated as such in a specific region
or sub-theme.
Concepts and theories of privacy in Africa
There is little literature that has dealt with the concep-
tualization of privacy in the African cultural context.
So far Johann Neethling appears to be the only author
who has attempted a definition of privacy in Africa.41
However, Neethling’s concept of privacy largely follows
the pattern of Western theories of privacy, particularly
in terms of control theory. On the other hand, Iain
Currie has dealt with the concept of privacy based on
the South African Constitution.42
Policies and data privacy regulations
Literature falling under this theme addresses, either
generally or specifically, the status of policies and data
privacy legislation in Africa. In 1999 David Banisar
noted that no country in Africa had data privacy
legislation.43 Nevertheless he still noted that South
Africa was reviewing the Open Democracy Bill. At the
same time Banisar noted that by then Uganda and
Namibia were considering in their parliaments the
freedom of access of information Acts. In 2002 Serge
Gutwirth took a similar view.44 However, Gutwirth
went further to point out that even the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (ACHR) fails to
mention privacy.45 Moreover, he took cognizance of
the fact that many African states mention privacy in
their constitutions.46 Yet such provisions have no sig-
nificant impact in securing such right.47 In 2004 Lee
A. Bygrave pointed out, just like his predecessors, that
none of the African countries had enacted comprehen-
sive data privacy laws.48 Like Banisar but differing
slightly from Gutwirth, Bygrave noted that only South
Africa had a constitution with a clause securing privacy
and Kenya was drafting a new constitution based on
the South African constitution.49 Yet as did Gutwirth,
he noted that ACHR omits to mention privacy.50
Bygrave’s views on the state of privacy are nearly
wholly repeated by Elizabeth M. Bakibinga partly
because she was influenced by the former’s article pub-
lished in 2004 and possibly because she is a former
student of Bygrave.51 In 2009 Adam Mambi listed
South Africa, Mauritius, and the Seychelles as African
countries with comprehensive data privacy legislation.52
However, it is noteworthy that in 2010 by way of up-
dating his previous work, Bygrave mentioned that four
countries in Africa, chiefly Francophone, had adopted
comprehensive data privacy legislation. The list
includes Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Morocco, and Maur-
itius.53 Interestingly, in the same year Kuner expanded
this list to include two more countries with data
privacy: Benin and South Africa.54 Yet in the same pub-
lication, Kuner lists South Africa as being in the
process of enacting data privacy legislation.55 In 2011,
in a global world map, Banisar listed Angola, Tunisia,
Morocco, Senegal, Benin, and Burkina Faso as African
countries with comprehensive data privacy legislation
by 1 November 2011.56 Perhaps a fairly comprehensive
list of African countries with data privacy legislation is
provided by Graham Greenleaf.57 According to
Greenleaf the list as it stood on 30 July 2011 includes
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mauritius,
Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. In 2012, Greenleaf
added the Seychelles to the list.58 Moreover, Greenleaf ’s
compilation lists the following African countries with
41 J Neethling, ‘The Concept of Privacy in South African Law’ (2005)
122/1 The South African Law Journal 18–28.
42 I Currie, ‘The Concept of Privacy in the South African Constitution:
Reprise’ (2008) 2008/3 Journal of South African Law 549–57.
43 D Banisar, ‘Privacy and Data Protection Around the World’, Conference
Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Privacy and
Personal Data Protection, Hong Kong, 13 September 1999, 1–5, at 4,
,http://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/infocentre/conference.html. accessed
26 February 2012.
44 S Gutwirth, Privacy and the Information Age (Rowman & Littlefield
Publ.,Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford/ 2002).
45 Ibid, at 24.
46 Ibid, at 24–5.
47 Ibid.
48 Bygrave (n 16), at 343.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 EM Bakibinga, ‘Managing Electronic Privacy in the Telecommunications
Sub-Sector: The Ugandan Perspective’ (2004) ,http//:thepublicvoic.org/
eventscapetown04/bakibinga.doc. accessed 27 May 2012, at 4 and 9.
52 A Mambi, ‘Internet Governance (IGF): Legal Issues on Cyber Security’
Mauritius, March 2009 (PowerPoint presentation) 19,
,http://www.atu-uat.org/images/presentations/IGF,MRTS,_
CYBERSECURITY2,MAMBI.pdf. accessed 25 February 2012.
53 LA Bygrave, ‘Privacy and Data Protection in an International
Perspective’ (2010) 56 Scandinavian Studies in Law 165–200, at 193.
54 C Kuner, ‘Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection
and Privacy Law: Past, Present, and Future’, TILT Law & Technology
Working Paper No. 016/2010 October 2010, Version: 1.0, p. 6, Social
Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection ,http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1689483. accessed 26 February 2012.
55 Ibid, at 22 and 90.
56 D Banisar, ‘Data Protection Laws around the World Map’
,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1951416.
accessed 26 February 2012.
57 G Greenleaf, ‘Global Data Privacy Laws: Forty Years of Acceleration’
(2011) 112 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 11–17 at
14–16.
58 G Greenleaf, ‘Global Data Privacy Laws: 89 Countries, and Accelerating’
(2012) 115 Privacy Laws & Business International Report, Special
Supplement; also appears cited as Queen Mary University of London,
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Bills and draft Bills on data privacy legislation: Ghana,
South Africa, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Kenya. In-
formation Shield provides that Morocco and South
Africa are African countries with comprehensive data
protection legislation.59 Jeff Rohlmeir lists none of
African countries as having data protection legisla-
tion.60
Apart from the general approach, some literature
has focused on and provided the status of policies and
data privacy law only in a particular country or some
specific countries or sub-region. There is a handful of
such literature. In South Africa, the majority of the lit-
erature cites that privacy is largely protected under the
constitution and common law. In addition, this litera-
ture quite generally lists some sector specific legislation,
mainly in the electronic communication sector, as se-
curing privacy. It also discusses the pending Protection
of Personal Information Bill 9/2009. The work of the
following authors specifically serves as an illustration of
the major literature on data privacy in South Africa:
Johann Neethling et al.,61 Anneliese Roos,62 Ian
Currie,63 Iain Currie and Jonathan Klaaren,64 Kate
Allan and Iain Currie,65 Jonathan Burchell,66 Caroline
Ncube,67 and Hendrik Johannes Gerhardus Oberhol-
zer.68 In Mauritius there is currently one known publi-
cation in the form of an article authored by Claire
Gayrel.69 The latter briefly analyses the Data Protection
Act 2004 in Mauritius. It is noteworthy that Gayrel’s
article is a direct product of a report analysing the ad-
equacy of the Mauritian data privacy legislation by the
European Union—a report for which Gayrel was
among the consultants and authors.70 In Zimbabwe,
Caroline Ncube points that the country does not have
comprehensive data privacy legislation.71 Neither does
its Constitution contain a privacy provision. Neverthe-
less, she contends that privacy can be read in other
provisions of the Constitution, notably protection
against arbitrary search or entry; protection against the
reprivatization of property; and protection of freedom
of expression. In addition, privacy is protected under
the common law. The recently published article in
Angola by Joa˜o Luı´s Trac¸a and Bernardo Embry72 com-
pletes the review in the Southern Africa region. This
article is the earliest comment on the data privacy le-
gislation in Angola adopted in June 2011, before it was
even put into implementation.
In Eastern Africa there is thin literature on the status
of policies and data privacy legislation. John Ubena has
School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 98/2012, pp. 1–13
,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000034.
accessed 26 February 2012.
59 Information Shield., ‘Information Privacy Law by Country’
,http://www.informationshield.com/intprivacylaws.html. accessed 26
February 2012.
60 J Rohlmeir, ‘International Data Protection Legislation Matrix’
,http://www.accinfosys.com/docs/International_Data_Protection_Laws.
pdf. accessed 25 February 2012.
61 J Neethling et al., Neethling–Potgieter–Vesser Law of Delict (6th edn,
LexisNexis, Durban 2010); J Neethling et al., Neethling’s Law of
Personality (2nd edn, LexisNexis, Durban 2004).
62 A Roos, ‘Data Protection for South Africa: Expectations Created by
Open Democracy Bill, 1998’, Proceedings of the Constitutional Right of
Access to Information Conference, 4 September 2000, St George’s Hotel,
Rietvlei Dam, Pretoria, pp. 41–53; A Roos, ‘The Law of Data (Privacy)
Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical Study’, LL.D Thesis,
University of South Africa (UNISA) (2003); A Roos, ‘Core Principles of
Data Protection Law’ (2006) 39/1 Comparative and International Law
Journal of Southern Africa 103–30; A Roos, ‘Data Protection:
Explaining the International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current South
African Position’ (2007) 124/2 South African Law Journal 400–37; A
Roos, ‘Personal Data Protection in New Zealand: Lessons for South
Africa?’ [2008] PER 22, ,http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2008/22.
html. accessed 26 February 2012; A Roos, ‘Data Protection’ in M
Dana, et al, Information and Communications Technology Law
(LexisNexis, Durban 2008).
63 I Currie, ‘Privacy and Forgetting: The Case of the TRC Archive’,
PowerPoint Presentation in the 25th International Conference of Data
Protection and Privacy Commissioners, 11 September 2003, Sydney
(Australia) ,http://www.privacyconference2003.org/program.asp.
accessed 26 February 2012; I Currie, ‘The Protection of Personal
Information Act and its Impact on Freedom of Information’ (University
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2010) 1–9 ,http://www.
opendemocracy.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/The-Protection-of-
Personal-Information-Act-and-its-Impact-on-Freedom-of-Information-
by-Iain-Currie.pdf., accessed 26 February 2012.
64 I Currie and J Klaaren, Commentary on the Promotion of Access to
Information Act (Siber Ink, South Africa 2002); I Currie and J Klaaren,
‘Evaluating the Information Bills: A Briefing Paper on the Protection of
Information Bill’, paper prepared on behalf of the Centre of Memory at
the Nelson Mandela Foundation, 17 June 2011, ,http://mg.co.za/
uploads/2011/06/28/110617-currie-klaaren-evaluating-the-information-
bills-548.pdf. accessed 26 February 2012.
65 A Kate and I Currie, ‘Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy
Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an Information Regulator for South
Africa, Current Developments’ (2007) 23/3 South African Journal of
Human Rights: Sexuality and the Law 570–86; also accessible at
,http://www.wits.ac.za/files/res4cdd5f670f1f4175a03dd36f6b8a9985.
pdf. accessed 26 Februaryy 2012.
66 J Burchell, ‘The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A
Transplantable Hybrid’ (2009) 13/1 Electronic Journal of Comparative
Law 1–26, at ,http://www.ejcl.org/131/art131-2.pdf. accessed
26 February 2012.
67 C Ncube, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Zimbabwean and South African
Data Protection Systems’ (2004) 2 Journal of Information, Law and
Technology (JILT) ,http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law2/elj/jilt/
2004_2/ncube/. accessed 25 February 2012; CB Ncube, ‘Watching the
Watcher: Recent Developments in Privacy Regulation and Cyber-
surveillance in South Africa’ (2006) 3/4 SCRIPTed 344–54.
68 HJG Oberholzer, ‘A Privacy Protection Model to Support Personal
Privacy in Relational Databases’, Msc. Dissertation, Rand Afrikaans
University (2001).
69 C Gayrel, ‘Mauritius: Data Protection in an Evolving Island Economy’
(2011) 114 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 20–2.
70 C Gayrel et al., ‘Analysis of the Adequacy of Protection of Personal Data
provided in Mauritius: Draft Final Report, 2010’, Research Centre on IT
and Law, University of Namur(Belgium) ,http://www.fundp.ac.be/
recherche/publications/page_view/70740/. (note that this report is not
readily accessible).
71 Ncube (n 67).
72 JL Traca and B Embry, ‘The Angolan Data Protection Act: First
Impressions’ (2012) 2/1 International Data Privacy Law 40–5.
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recently published an article ‘Privacy: A Forgotten
Right in Tanzania’.73 He notes that Tanzania has no
data privacy legislation. Nevertheless, privacy is pro-
tected in a number of statutes such as the Human
DNA Regulation Act 2009. In Uganda, Bakibinga
reveals that the country has no data privacy legislation
although privacy right is stipulated in the Ugandan
Constitution 1995 and other statutory laws albeit in an
ad hoc fashion.74 In the same vein Kato Mivule and
Claude Tuner posit, ‘there is little or no known litera-
ture on data privacy from Uganda and much of sub-
Saharan Africa in general, given the relatively young
and developing computing domain. At this time, to the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to call for the
application of data privacy techniques in Uganda’.75 A
similar situation is seen in Kenya where Michael
Murungi notes that no data privacy legislation exists.76
Yet he points out that the protection of privacy is
afforded in some statutes. Also, Murungi tells us that
Kenya is currently considering a draft Bill (Draft Data
Protection Bill 2009) on data privacy law. Article 19
[an organization that campaigns against laws and prac-
tices infringing basic human rights] had made its com-
ments on this Bill to the effect that the proposed Bill is
critically limited.77 In particular, Article 19 raised con-
cerns over the scope of the proposed law, which is
restricted to the public sector while the private sector is
left unregulated. Also, the draft Bill fails to exempt
public servants from its application when they are con-
ducting public business. The other issue raised by
Article 19 is limited funding for the office of Informa-
tion Commission that is charged with the implementa-
tion of the law. Finally, Article 19 is concerned with the
use of unlinked concepts in the draft Bill, that is some
concepts are provided in the definitions but are not
mentioned again in the draft Bill. Iain Walden has gen-
erally considered the level of data privacy protection in
the East African Community (Tanzania, Kenya,
Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda).78 This is possibly the
single known comparative study of data privacy pol-
icies and legislation in the Eastern Africa. Walden notes
that there is no privacy legislation in any of the East
Africa Community member countries.79 Yet he notes
further that only Rwanda and Kenya had issued propo-
sals that address data protection and privacy issues.
Also, Walden mentions that Rwanda has provisions in
its Penal Code that criminalize infractions against
privacy.80 To a limited extent, Greenleaf has recently
considered the state of privacy policies and law in the
East African Community (EAC).81 He notes that al-
though there is a desire and some effort to enact such
laws, currently only Kenya is the only country in the
region considering draft legislation on data privacy law.
Little literature on the status of privacy is known to
exist in the Horn of Africa. However, Alebachew
B. Enyew’s recent master of law thesis provides some
useful guidance on the state of data privacy policy and
law in Ethiopia.82 Enyew reveals that in Ethiopia a
privacy right is secured under the Ethiopian
Constitution.83 However, as of now, Ethiopia does not
have data privacy legislation. Privacy protection can be
found in scattered privacy provisions in the Criminal
Procedure Code, Civil Code, and Freedom of Mass
Media & Access to Information Proclamation.84 Enyew
generally finds the system of privacy protection in Ethi-
opia to be inadequate.
In North Africa, there is a recently published journal
article by Claire Gayrel.85 The article focuses on Tunisia
and Morocco. As was the case with Mauritius, Gayrel
relied on the adequacy assessment reports by the Euro-
pean Union, for which she was a member of the team
of consultants for the assessment and also one of the
authors of the report.86 Essentially in her 2012 journal
article on Tunisia and Morocco, Gayrel advances a
comparison of the regime of data privacy in the two
jurisdictions. She notes that while both countries have
73 J Ubena, ‘Privacy: A Forgotten Right in Tanzania’ (2012) 1/2 The
Tanzania Lawyer 72–114.
74 Bakibinga (n 51).
75 K Mivule and C Turner, ‘Applying Data Privacy Techniques on Tabular
Data in Uganda’ ,http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1107/1107.3784.
pdf. accessed 26 February 2012.
76 MM Murungi, Cyber Law in Kenya (Kluwer Law International The
Hague 2011) chs 6 and 8.
77 Article 19, ‘Draft Data Protection Bill Critically Limited’, Comments
submitted to the Constitution Commission of Kenya (CCK) in October
2011 ,http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2825/en/kenya
:-draft-data-protection-bill-critically-limited. accessed 26 February
2012.
78 I Walden, ‘East African Community Task Force on Cyber Laws:
Comparative Review and Draft Legal Framework’, Draft v.1.0, 2/5/08
prepared on behalf of UNCTAD and the EAC, May 2008.
79 Ibid, at 8.
80 Ibid, at 8.
81 Greenleaf (n 58).
82 AB Enyew, ‘Regulatory Legal Regime on the Protection of Privacy and
Personal Information in Ethiopia’, LL.M Thesis, University of Oslo,
Norway (20090.
83 Ibid, at 27–43.
84 Ibid.
85 C Gayrel, ‘Data Protection in the Arab Spring:Tunisia and Morocco’
(2012) 115 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 18–20.
86 See, e.g., C Gayrel et al., ‘Analysis of the Adequacy of Protection of
Personal Data Provided in Tunisia: Final Report, 2010’, Research Centre
on IT and Law, University of Namur (Belgium) ,http://alexandrie.droit.
fundp.ac.be/GEIDEFile/6544.pdf?Archive=192619191089&File=
6544_pdf. accessed 26 February 2012 (note that unlike the report on
Mauritius, this report is readily accessible).
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data privacy legislation, Morocco’s law is closer to the
European model (Directive 95/46/EC) while Tunisia’s
law, although modelled along the lines of the European
law, falls significantly short of such a standard.
In West Africa, the literature on privacy and data
protection policies and legislation largely focuses on
the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)87 and individual countries in the region.
The literature on ECOWAS largely presents in a glori-
ous manner that, unlike other sub-regions of Africa,
West Africa has comprehensive framework legislation
at the sub-regional level (ie ECOWAS). This body of
literature includes that authored by Graham
Greenleaf,88 Wale S. Ajala,89 and Teki Akuetteh.90 At
the country level, Enyinna S. Nwauche writes on the
state of privacy rights in Nigeria.91 Nwauche contends
that privacy in Nigeria is protected via the Nigerian
Constitution 1999 and through the tort of breach of
confidence or the tort of privacy. Yet he finds no
decided case on the tort of breach of confidence in
Nigeria. Joa˜o Luı´s and Bernardo Embry write on the
state of privacy and data protection in Cape Verde.92
They note that in Cape Verde privacy is first of all pro-
tected under the Cape Verdean Constitution(2010
Revised Edition) as a correspondence of the communi-
cation right in Article 44 and as habeas data in Article
46. Over and above this, Cape Verde has had data
privacy legislation since 2001 making her the first
African country to enact such a law. Yet up to
2011(when Trac¸a and Embry’s article was published)
Cape Verde had not yet established a data protection
authority that would set the law in motion.
Culture and privacy
Literature on culture and privacy occupies the domin-
ant discourse in explaining the state of privacy in
Africa in this section. The main thrust of this literature
is that privacy in Africa is undeveloped because of the
prevalence of the culture of collectivism as opposed to
the Western culture of individualism. Accordingly, the
authors argue that as Africans live in associations, an
individual is denied a space for claiming his/her right
to privacy. To put this another way, what the authors
of the literature on culture and privacy are arguing, is
that individualism is a pre-condition for the existence
of attitudes and values realting to privacy. Included in
this strand of thought are scholars such as Gutwirth,93
Bygrave,94 Bakibinga,95 Burchell,96 and Olinger et al.97
However, there are some important variations in this
literature that it is worthwhile mentioning. For
example, in 2004 Bygrave cautioned that African cul-
tures should not be considered static categories.98 He
also pointed out that the provision for privacy rights is
increasingly on the legislative agendas of some African
countries. As to why there is this growing interest,
Bygrave advances three main reasons: the obligation
imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 1966; a desire to meet the adequacy
requirements of Articles 25–26 of the EU Directive;
and in some cases stimulus is provided by recent first-
hand experience of mass oppression (eg South
Africa).99 Yet in 2010, in taking cognizance of the
adoption of data privacy legislation by certain African
jurisdictions, Bygrave offered a new explanation: this
development partly reflects the efforts by the French
data protection authority(Commission de l’Informa-
tique et des Liberte´s (CNIL)) to cultivate data protec-
tion in former French colonies, but it also reflects
economic concerns, particularly the desire by some of
these countries to safeguard their outsourcing indus-
try(this is the case with, eg, Tunisia and Morocco).100
Bakibinga draws the interesting conclusion that one
can have privacy and still be part of the community’.101
Olinger et al.’s observations and conclusions are
equally worthy of being highlighted. Unlike the other
scholars in this category, Olinger et al., wrote specifical-
87 ECOWAS has 15 members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory
Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, and Togo.
88 Greenleaf (n 58).
89 WS Ajala, ‘Enabling Harmonisation of Cyber Legislation at the Sub
Regional Level: Opportunities and Challenges’, The Second Session of
the Committee on Development, Information, Science and Technology
(CODIST II) 2–5 May 2011, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ,http://repository.
uneca.org/codist/sites/default/files/codist/ICT/Day1_May02/Enabling%
20Harmonization%20of%20Cyber%20Legislation%20at%20the%
20Sub%20Regional%20Level.pdf. accessed 26 February 2012.
90 T Akuetteh, ‘Creating the Enabling Environment within ECOWAS
Region’, PowerPoint presentation ,http://meeting.afrinic.net/waigf/
presentations/Presentation_%20Ecowas_Teki_Akuetteh/
Presentation_Ecowas_Teki_Akuetteh.pdf. accessed 26 February 2012.
91 ES Nwauche, ‘The Right to Privacy in Nigeria’ (2007) 1/1 Review of
Nigerian Law and Practice 62–90.
92 JL Traca and B Embry, ‘An Overview of the Legal Regime for Data
Protection in Cape Verde’ (2011) 1/4 International Data Privacy Law
249–55.
93 Gutwirth (n 44) at 24–5.
94 Bygrave (n 16) at 328; Bygrave (n 53) at 175–6.
95 Bakibinga (n 51) at 2, 4–5.
96 Burchell (n 66) at 2.
97 HN Olinger, et al., ‘Western privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some Critical
Comments on the influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill in
South Africa’ (2007) 39/1 International Information & Library Review
31–43, at 35–6.
98 Bygrave (n 94) at 328.
99 Ibid, at 343.
100 Bygrave (n 53) at 194.
101 EPIC Alert, ‘EPIC Hosts Privacy and Public Voice Conference in Africa’
(23 December 2005) 11/24 EPIC Alert ,http://www.epic.org/alert/
EPIC_Alert_11.24.html. accessed 26 February 2012.
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ly in response to comments on the South African Bill
on data privacy. They examined whether the African
collectivist culture manifesting itself in the name of
Ubuntu in South Africa would have any impact on the
proposed law. The authors’ observations and conclu-
sions can be summarized as follows. The influence of
Ubuntu would be of less significance in the develop-
ment of privacy legislation in South Africa.102 These
authors advance three main reasons for their view:
first, although human dignity is the prime Ubuntu
value that has been infused into the Constitution of
South Africa there exist no Ubuntu-specific references
to privacy in the Constitution in the current privacy
related legislation in South Africa.103 Second, although
Ubuntu can, and indeed has, influenced jurisprudence
in South Africa, it could only do so in those areas
where Ubuntu has a strong expression and philosophy.
In the case of privacy, Ubuntu leaves little doubt that
privacy is not esteemed as priority for the community
or for the individual.104 Third, the notion of Ubuntu is
to a certain extent an idealistic concept in a world of
economic realities that is regulated and controlled by
international standards, rules, and regulations such
as those designed by, amongst others, the World
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the
EU.105 Because of that, Ubuntu is exclusive and limited
to the African way of life. It is not incorporated into
global trade agreements and its very nature is cultural,
not legal or economical. On their finding of a great in-
fluence of the EU’s data privacy law to the forthcoming
data privacy law in South Africa, Olinger et al. advance
three reasons. First, the protection of dignity which is a
core expression of the EU’s data privacy law overlaps
with Ubuntu’s concept of human dignity, the South
African Constitutional principle of dignity, as well as
the common law concept of personal dignity.106
Second, that the South African Constitution enshrines
the right to privacy as a constitutional right, which is
the highest possible order of protection and embodi-
ment of a right.107 This is similar to the description of
the privacy right in the EU’s privacy legislation which
is comprehensive and also compulsory in all EU
member states. Third, since the EU is the major
trading partner of South Africa, its directives, charters,
and protocols will have an influence and direct bearing
on South Africa.108 This is because of requirements
under the EU’s data privacy legislation which restrict
the transfer of personal data to a third country unless
it has adequate privacy protection.
Religion and privacy
Religion has also been studied in the context of
privacy. In particular the literature in this area has
tended to focus primarily on Islamic religion. The
dominant discourse is that Islamic religion and prac-
tices produce an unfavourable environment for indivi-
duals to advance claims for individual privacy. Two
things are frequently discussed as affecting privacy.
First, the majority of jurisdictions with a Muslim popu-
lation favour adopting Islam as the state religion.
Second, but somewhat linked to the first, such states
tend to adopt sharia law as the supreme law of the
land, undermining any constitutional right to privacy
and eroding the traditional roles of organs established
by such constitutions. However this view has been
resisted and favourable arguments that make Islam
compatible with privacy have been advanced even
where practices are inconsistent to these arguments. In
the African context, the literature on Islam and privacy
focuses on North Africa and the West African state of
Nigeria, particularly the northern states which are pre-
dominantly Islamic. A joint article by Mireille
M. Caurana and Joseph A. Cannataci109 and a sole-
authored article by Ayo Kusamotu110 are important
sources in this part of the review.
To begin with, Caurana and Cannataci examine the
impact (applicability) of EU Directive 95/46 on the
protection of personal data in the North Africa and
Middle Eastern states where Islamic culture or Islamic
law underlies much of everyday legal practice. Accord-
ing to the authors, this examination was prompted by
one major factor: the movement by EU-based indus-
tries of more and more of their operations to North
Africa and Islamic law states in order to take advantage
of lower labour costs.111 Focusing on Tunisia, the
authors point out that Tunisia has adopted a law on
102 Olinger et al, (n 97) at 40.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid, at 40–1.
107 Ibid, at 41.
108 Ibid.
109 MM Carauna and JA Cannataci, ‘European Union Privacy and Data
Protection Principles: Compatibility with Culture and Legal Frameworks
in Islamic States’ (2007) 16/2 Information & Communications
Technology Law 99–124.
110 A Kusamotu, ‘Privacy Law and Technology in Nigeria: The Legal
Framework will not meet the Test of Adequacy as Mandated by
Article 25 of European Union Directive 95/46’ (2007) 16/2 Information
& Communications Technology Law 149–59.
111 Ibid, at 100.
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data protection. However, they argue that although
such a law is prima facie word perfect vis-a`-vis EU Dir-
ective 95/46, its implementation is possibly seriously
marred by, among other things, the use of personal
data for police purposes, which reportedly falls far
short of the EU standard entrenched in Recommenda-
tion R(87)15.112 Kusamotu considers the Nigerian legal
framework for the protection of privacy in the context
of the ‘adequacy’ test in EU Directive 95/46/EC. His
analyses reveal that such a legal framework fails to
meet the standard set by the European law. Kusamotu
raises three important points: first, Nigeria does not
have specific privacy laws, but guarantees the right to
privacy in her Constitution; second, Article 37 of the
Nigerian Constitution 1999 on protection of the right
to privacy is discriminatory and segregative to non-
Nigerians. This provision states ‘the privacy of citizen
. . . ’ Accordingly Kusamotu argues, ‘it would therefore
appear that in the case of the personal data of non-
Nigerians that are being processed or are to undergo
processing after being transferred to Nigeria, the
individuals concerned will not be able to enforce their
fundamental right to privacy under the Constitu-
tion’;113 third, that the absence of data protection laws
in Nigeria is not connected to the percentage of
Muslims in Nigeria’s population or to any tenet
of faith, Muslim, Christian, or otherwise, but rather to
the low level of data processing and awareness about its
implications for privacy.114
Developmentalism and privacy
The literature surrounding development and privacy
tends to argue that the current diminishing state of
privacy in Africa is a result of developmentalism efforts
by African countries after independence. According to
the authorities in this strand, African countries
neglected to deal with privacy issues as were of no pri-
orities to the countries. Ncube is the leading scholar to
maintain this view.115 She argues, ‘from the time of in-
dependence Zimbabweans have been predominantly
concerned with those rights pertaining to pressing pol-
itical and economic issues such as the rising cost of
living. Subsequently, issues such as data protection
have been largely overlooked.’116
ICTs and privacy
Literature under this heading treats the penetration and
use of information and communication technologies
(ICTs) in Africa as among the catalysts for the rising
concern for privacy. Usually the massive collection of
personal information and the relatively easy possibilities
for abuse of such information have generated public
fears about individuals’ privacy. Authorities who have
clearly linked ICTs with the rise of privacy concerns in
Africa include the following: Banisar,117 Roos,118 Baki-
binga,119 Kusamotu,120 and Enyew.121 Of these scholars,
Banisar seems to have made a fairly detailed analysis of
the threat posed by ICTs in the African contexts. He has
dealt with information systems and privacy including
developments of national ID card systems, biometric
passports, DNA databases, and body scanners. He also
dealt with communications issues such as surveillance
capabilities, identity of users, and cyber-crimes. Other
scholars who have fairly dealt with issues of ICTs and
privacy include Human Rights Watch,122 Alex Comni-
nos,123 and Ilhem Allagui.124 The latter two authorities
have dealt with the role of ICTs in the context of the
Arab spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Their litera-
ture shows to what extent ICTs, particularly social net-
works (Twitter and Facebook), were used by the
protestors to organize and wage protests and at the
same time to what extent and how the regimes in those
countries relied on the same or facilities to snoop on
protestors.
Telecommunication and privacy
This literature is somewhat related to that in the previ-
ous paragraph, but it was not discussed there because of
its specialized nature. There is a large body of literature
developed under this theme. However, a few points
must be made clear. First, the literature on
telecommunications (including other forms of electron-
ic communication) has mushroomed partly because of
112 Carauna and Cannataci (n 109) at 115.
113 Kusamotu (n 110) at 154.
114 Ibid, at 157.
115 Ncube (A Comparative Analysis of Zimbabwean and South African Data
Protection Systems) (n 65).
116 Ibid.
117 D Banisar, ‘Linking ICTs, The Right to Privacy, Freedom of Expression
and Access to Information’ (20100 16/1 East African Journal of Peace &
Human Rights 124–54.
118 Roos (n 62).
119 Bakibinga (n 51).
120 Kusamotu (n 110).
121 Enyew (n 82).
122 Human Right Watch., ‘The Internet in Mideast and North Africa: Free
Expression and Censorship’, Human Rights Watch 1999 ,http://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/midintnt996.PDF. accessed
26 February 2012.
123 A Comninos, ‘Twitter Revolutions and Cyber Crackdowns: User-
Generated Content and Social Networking in the Arab Spring and
Beyond’, Association for Progressive Communications (APC) (June
2011), 1–18, at 5 ,http://www.apc.org/en/system/files/
AlexComninos_MobileInternet.pdf. accessed 26 February 2012.
124 I Allagui, ‘The Arab Spring and the Role of ICTs: Editorial Introduction’
(2011) 5 International Journal of Communication 1435–42.
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two factors: first a recent requirement for the
mandatory registration of SIM cards in many African
countries. Included in the list of countries with manda-
tory SIM card registration are Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria,
Botswana, Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zim-
babwe, Burundi, Rwanda, Gambia, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Algeria, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire(Ivory Coast),
and Uganda. The literature has partly followed this
pattern. Second, the recent adoption of interception of
communication laws in some African jurisdictions.
Authorities writing on this theme include Roos,125
Ewan Sutherland,126 Ncube,127 Tracy Cohen,128 Dumi-
sani Ndlela,129 Jacob Mapfume,130 Alex B. Makulilo,131
Michael Murungi,132 Stephen C. Kaduuli,133 Ronald
K. Mayambala,134 Bakibinga,135 Amnesty Internation-
al,136 Chikaodili J. Hemeson,137 Kajo Anan,138 Chuk-
wuyere E. Izuogu,139 Iheanyi S. Nwanko,140 and
Franklin F. Akinsuyi.141 The issues considered by these
scholars are similar. They include the mandatory regis-
tration of SIM cards without an enabling law in place;
secret interception of communications; poor database
security; poor verification of consumers’ information
during registration; the authorization of interception; a
lack of an effective enforcement system; and inadequate
remedy or lack of a remedy at all when infringement
occurs.
Health and privacy
The literature on health and privacy has largely been
manifested in the context of HIV/Aids. This is partly
because Africa is by far the continent most affected by
the HIV pandemic. Reports reveal that by the end of
2010 an estimated 22.9 million people were living with
HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, a figure which was equal to
68 per cent of the world population living with HIV at
that time.142 The pandemic had cost the lives of 1.3
million people in the sub-continent by 2009 leaving 1.8
million newly infected.143 Efforts to prevent or provide
care and support to people living with HIV/Aids have
raised a number of privacy law issues. Consent to HIV/
Aids testing is the most controversial issue surrounding
privacy. Many people in Africa are concerned about
HIV/Aids testing without their consent. Since HIV/
Aids has no cure, many people consider their health
125 Roos (Data Protection) (n 62).
126 E Sutherland, ‘The Mandatory Registration of SIM Cards’ (2010) 16/3
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records in the context of HIV/Aids as most sensitive,
fearing stigmatization.144 The second issue stemming
from the first is about disclosure of HIV/Aids test
results or status to third parties without the authoriza-
tion of the people concerned. This has resulted in
serious problems in the health and employment
sectors. Medical practitioners in Africa claim to be in
dilemma whether to disclose or not to disclose an HIV/
Aids status to a victim’s sex partner or relatives, as the
case may be.145 Yet in some cases, without any consent
from a concerned person, they have secretly been com-
municating HIV/Aids test results directly to employers
while bypassing the employees who were the subject of
testing.146 Somewhat linked with the second issue, is
discrimination of people living with HIV/Aids. Once
their HIV/Aids status is revealed, many people living
with HIV/Aids have found themselves discriminated
against. This discrimination does not just end with the
employment sector as is commonly cited by commen-
tators147 but extends to other spheres of life. In Kenya,
discrimination has also manifested in issues of land
ownership.148 Nevertheless in relative terms, concerns
for privacy in the context of HIV/Aids in Africa has
manifested through the development of a larger corpus
of case law on privacy.149
E-Commerce and privacy
The literature on e-commerce and privacy is relatively
lacking. Although, at the risk of generalizing, this is
partly due to the fact that e-commerce in Africa is low
compared to the rest of the world. There is across
Africa an inadequate e-commerce infrastructure.
However, in relative terms, South Africa is far more
advanced in e-commence than any other African
country.150 Because of that, research in this area is still
evolving. Some authorities known to have canvassed
privacy in the context of e-commerce include: Philip
Plu¨ckhahn,151 Janie Joubert and Jean-Paul van Belle,152
Anthony C. K. Kakooza153 and the Department of
Communications–Republic of South Africa.154 It is
also imperative to note, there is a paper by an
unnamed author based on empirical research of web-
sites supporting e-commerce in South Africa and issues
of privacy.155 Throughout the period of collection,
efforts to obtain its author have been made in vain, yet
the same is published on a credible website. For this
reason this review has decided to include it. Issues
addressed in these works relate to consumer trust and
confidence; cyber-crimes; and identity thefts.
Analysis
The above review of literature reveals that the corpus of
data protection scholarship is still in its nascent stage.
This is unsurprising, partly due to the fact that privacy
and data protection is a new field of law in Africa, with
only a few experts having a research interest in the
subject. Relatively, South Africa is far more advanced
compared to the rest of African countries in terms of
this literature. This is probably because privacy and
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data protection form part of the curriculum in some
universities and hence there is a growing number of
experts with an interest in the subject. In the rest of
Africa the situation is not satisfactory. With the excep-
tion of Tanzania which has ICT law teaching at master
degree level currently only at the Open University of
Tanzania (with the support of the International Tele-
communication Union and experts from the University
of Strathclyde in Scotland), and at least the University
of Dar es Salaam, where ICT law is taught at under-
graduate only as an optional subject(or as an elective
for an advanced coursework paper at postgraduate
level), little is known for similar institutions teaching
ICT law in Africa. However, in mitigating this problem,
experts from different African countries are trained
abroad, especially in Europe and the United States.
Since financing training abroad is quite expensive, the
number of these experts is still relatively small.
The review has also discovered that there is a
virtually total lack of comparative studies in Africa on
privacy and data protection. Many publications focus
on a specific jurisdiction, quite often the country of
residence of the authors. However, there are exceptions.
The little comparative literature available can be classi-
fied into two groups. One group engages comparison
between an African jurisdiction and a foreign one
(outside Africa). This is the case with some of Roos’
works. Illustrations of other literature falling under this
category are the works of Mayambala and Plu¨ckhahn.
The other category of comparative literature involves
African jurisdictions as demonstrated by one of the
journal articles of Ncube (involving Zimbabwe and
South Africa) and Gayrel (involving Tunisia and
Morocco). This lack of comparative literature can be
explained by a number of possible reasons: a lack of re-
search funds; a lack of networking among experts; the
limited accessibility to literature authored by other
scholars in different jurisdictions; a limited knowledge
of legal systems of other jurisdictions; limited skills in
undertaking comparative studies; linguistic barriers;
cultural barriers; political and security reasons; and so
on. The complaint by the Ugandan authors Mivule and
Tuner illustrates some of these problems. Their state-
ment deserves to be rewritten: ‘there is little or no
known literature on data privacy from Uganda and
much of sub-Saharan Africa in general, given the rela-
tively young and developing computing domain. At
this time, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to call for the application of data privacy techniques in
Uganda.’156 The interesting part of this complaint is the
self-declaration to be the first scholars to deal with
issues of privacy in Uganda.
Somewhat linked to the issue of comparative litera-
ture is the growing tendency of a substantial amount of
the material to turn into pseudo comparative studies or
literature. The latter situation arises where an item of
literature on a particular African jurisdiction maintains
an unreasonable length of background information
based on non-African foreign jurisdictions, particularly
European and US law and materials, leaving only a few
paragraphs for discussion of the African jurisdiction.
Arguably most of this literature remains too descriptive
of what is obvious or known rather than being analyt-
ical and at best it fails to contribute to the development
of the emerging African scholarship on data privacy.
Some examples of this literature warrant mention with
brief analysis. However, for want of space, I will take
one most recent illustration of a journal article by
Ubena—‘Privacy: A Forgotten Right in Tanzania’. The
title of this article promises much about Tanzanian
privacy rights. Yet, on reading it one finds European
data privacy law dominating the stage. It is surprising
in an article that has 42 pages (72–114), that reference
to Tanzania is restricted to a total space of just four
pages. One would have expected to find the anatomy of
the entire system of privacy in Tanzania albeit without
comprehensive data privacy legislation, how it operates
in practice, the constraints on its operation, etc. In my
view it is not sufficient to mention that Tanzania has
no comprehensive data privacy legislation. Perhaps an
explanation for that would have been useful. It appears
Ubena wants his audience to believe that once a com-
prehensive data privacy law is adopted in Tanzania,
privacy will be automatically secured. This is certainly
misleading because even in Europe privacy is infringed
in the face of comprehensive data privacy legislation.
Also important to note, the above literature
contains some serious factual errors. This can be seen
particularly in matters of the status of policies and data
protection regulations discussed above. There are two
sets of these errors. First, there is inclusion and exclu-
sion of countries from a list of African jurisdictions
with data privacy legislation. Sometimes it is difficult
to understand the correct current list of countries with
data privacy law in Africa. It can be seen, for example,
that in 2010 Bygrave and Kuner maintain different lists.
Likewise in 2002 and 2004 both Gutwirth and Bygrave
maintained that no African jurisdiction had data
privacy legislation. Interestingly in 2004 Bakibinga
quoted Bygrave to say no African jurisdiction had com-
156 Mivule and Turner (n 75).
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prehensive data privacy. In 2011 Greenleaf too made
some omissions of jurisdictions in Africa with data
privacy legislation. Yet in 2012 he updated this position
to present the correct list. The second factual error,
related to the first, is the chronological timing of the
adoption of such laws. Greenleaf ’s 2012 list correctly
provides the timing for the adoption of data privacy le-
gislation in Africa. But what do these factual errors tell
us? Surely the problem is one of the accessibility to reli-
able information and literature in the African context. I
will turn to this shortly.
Moreover some of the literature contains contradic-
tions in its analyses. The literature on culture and
privacy serves as an illustration. The strand takes col-
lectivist culture as its independent variable for the state
of privacy in Africa. Yet subsequently, this scholarship
abruptly departs from its original premise. For example
in 2004 Bygrave suggested that although African coun-
tries had no data privacy legislation due to the culture
of collectivism, he left open the possibility of the
African countries and particularly their collectivist
culture to change. This possibility is captured in his
own words, ‘African cultures should not be painted
static categories’. By any standard of interpretation
Bygrave was suggesting that in a particular stage of its
development, African culture would turn into individu-
alism, hence providing the optimum environment for
privacy to take root in the region. However, contradic-
tions to that view started in the same year (2004) when
he went further to point out that the interest in legis-
lating in Africa was also due to the impact of Articles
25 and 26 of EC Directive 95/46 and the desire by
African countries to meet the requirements of Euro-
pean law set out in those provisions. Similarly Bygrave
identified recent first-hand experience of mass oppres-
sion (eg South Africa) as the stimulus for the adoption
of data privacy law. The question is, can these two
factors operate in an environment where the culture of
collectivism is prevalent? In 2010 Bygrave departed
further by saying that the emergence of data privacy
law in the former French colonies was a result of the
efforts of the French data protection authority(Com-
mission de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s (CNIL)) to
cultivate data protection in former French colonies.
Bygrave does not explain what he meant by ‘cultivating
data protection’. Moreover, he does not offer any detail
as to how the data protection authority in France ‘cul-
tivated’ data protection in the former French colonies.
Where is our independent variable? Admittedly more
than one factor can operate jointly to different degrees
to produce one desired effect. But can the emergence
of data privacy legislation in some African jurisdictions
offer sufficient evidence of the African cultural trans-
formation that was foreseen by Bygrave (ie from collect-
ivism to individualism)? If not, how can such legislation
be made to operate in an environment dominated by a
collectivist culture? Or should it be argued that African
countries are adopting data privacy merely to meet the
criteria of Articles 25 and 26 of the European Directive?
Apart from such contradictions, some of the litera-
ture has misplaced the contexts of their analyses. It is
sufficient to point out one example by Gayrel. In her
latest article she has adopted the title ‘Data Protection
in the Arab Spring: Tunisia and Morocco’. Immediately
I saw this title I linked its analyses to the Arab revolu-
tions in Tunisia and Morocco. Unfortunately I was a
victim of the saying ‘don’t judge a book by its cover’.
The message conveyed by this article was different. It
was comparing data privacy legislation in Tunisia and
Morocco. Moreover, the article’s analyses were triggered
by reports and analysis of the adequacy of personal data
protection in such countries carried in 2010, well before
the Arab Spring. The author makes only one reference
to the Arab Spring in a single sentence at the end of her
article (p. 20). Since this is not fiction, the message
needs to tally with its title however stylistically it is for-
mulated. The way the title of Gayrel’s article appears is
misleading and may make her audience pick it readily
while assembling a literature review only to find later
that it has nothing to do at all with the Arab Spring.
The literature also depicts a growing interest by
European scholarship in Africa. However, most of it
has been offshore and ad hoc in nature and without
detailed analyses of the African socioeconomic and pol-
itical environment (see, eg, Bygrave, Gutwirth, Green-
leaf). Perhaps a relatively more detailed literature is
that authored by Gayrel. It is submitted that joint
researches by European scholars with Africans may
stimulate the development of data privacy in Africa.
This is partly because of the limitations the former
suffer in understanding African contexts.
As pointed out, limited accessibility to information
is one such constraint which impedes research in
Africa. This limitation may be due to different reasons:
infrastructure (eg poor internet connectivity); lack of
research funding; and a lack of networking and cooper-
ation among researchers. I have to point out that the
limitation to access of information does not necessarily
come from within Africa. Sometimes it originates from
outside. I will briefly explain, as I have myself suffered
this ordeal. In December 2011, I made a request for a
supply of four reports from researchers who undertook
a study on the analysis of the adequacy of personal
data protection in Mauritius, Tunisia, Burkina Faso,
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and Senegal. I needed the reports as part of my
ongoing research on data protection in Africa. Some of
those researchers opted not to reply my request.
However, one of them replied to my request telling me
that the reports were confidential as the research study
giving birth to such reports was commissioned by a
client. I was advised to ask the client for the reports
directly. While my request to the client is still pending
to date, one of the researchers who opted not to reply
to my request has up to now issued two publications in
the form of journal articles based on three of the
reports I requested. The question is, if those reports
were confidential in the first place why has it occurred
they are being extracted and made available to the
public? Are these reports still confidential?
Conclusion
The overview of the above review of the literature on
data privacy policies and regulations in Africa indicates
that its current state is underdeveloped. Yet, there are
prospects for continued growth. Such growth, however,
depends on various factors. In this article I make a
modest proposal that experts establish a network as a
starting point. To start with, networking may be estab-
lished from the level of two or more experts within and
outside their countries. With time, many will come to
know each other and exchange experiences. In the
course of this networking, experts may come together
in joint writing or by facilitating each other to gain
access to information in foreign jurisdictions. From the
stage of knowing each other, formal networks may be
established through institutions or other possible
avenues. Out of the formal networks, experts may plan
and think of the best ways of moving forward, particu-
larly in carrying out research that is relevant to solving
the problems facing their countries.
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